Puzzles About the American Economy in the Current Recession and Recovery by William D. Nordhaus
The Recent Recession, the Current
Recovery, and Stock Prices
ASO FAPRIL 2002 THE signs of economic recovery are sprouting like
spring ﬂowers. The United States has emerged from the short but painful
winter that followed the burst of the asset bubble in early 2000 and the
anxiety caused by the events of September 11 and the anthrax scare in the
fall of 2001. 
This report addresses the current state of the economy. What were the
salient characteristics of the 2001 recession? What is the state of the econ-
omy today? How does the latest business cycle compare with earlier
cycles? What are the initial conditions of and therefore the prospects for
the recovery? What are the conditions of proﬁts and equity markets?
Although it is clearly too early to write the deﬁnitive economic history of
the recent downturn, it is nonetheless useful to describe the terrain as it
appears in early 2002.
2001: The Mildest Recession
To begin with, it appears that the 2001 recession was extremely mild.
Real GDP growth was close to zero in the second half of 2001, and unem-
ployment rose relatively little. Was it really a recession? For that matter,
what is a recession?
From the point of view of economic welfare, business downturns are
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incomes, and cause the economic pain of involuntary unemployment.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines a recession
as a period with “a signiﬁcant decline in activity spread across the econ-
omy, lasting more than a few months, visible in industrial production,
employment, real income, and wholesale-retail sales.”1 Technically, a
recession or contraction is a period of declining economic activity
because the term refers to the slope of the economy’s trajectory rather
than its level relative to a high-employment benchmark. From an eco-
nomic point of view, however, the levels of output, unemployment, and
employment relative to a high-employment baseline are probably more
important than their derivatives.
To gauge the severity of the 2001 recession compared with earlier
ones, I ﬁrst examine some of the fundamental variables involved in busi-
ness cycles. Figure 1 shows a measure of business conditions that is
designed to capture substantial declines in output. It shows an index that
is zero if the economy is growing and equals the two-quarter growth rate
of real GDP if that term is negative. The shaded areas are the NBER con-
tractions (recessions). This measure is an accurate predictor of NBER
recessions in that it calls every NBER recession and has no false posi-
tives. The latest recession barely sneaks in the door, however. The nega-
tive growth for 2001 is barely visible and is by a wide margin the smallest
downward spike of any postwar recession.
A closely related indicator of cyclical conditions is total nonfarm
employment. If we construct a series based on two-quarter employment
growth rates (not shown) like that in ﬁgure 1, periods in which employ-
ment declined are also good predictors of NBER recessions. Job loss was
substantial in the 2001 recession, but the series has a pattern very similar
to that in ﬁgure 1, with the 2001 recession virtually tying with the 1970
recession for the smallest postwar decline. 
Figure 2 shows an analogous measure for the unemployment rate. Here
the line shows increases in the four-quarter unemployment rate when
unemployment is rising and is at zero when it is falling; recessions are
again shown as shaded areas. This measure produces several false posi-
tives, indicating that the unemployment rate is a less reliable indicator of
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1. NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, March 11, 2002, at www.nber.org/cycles/
recessions.html. 
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hold that when the four-quarter change in the unemployment rate is
greater than 1 percentage point, we have a reliable indicator of recession.
By the unemployment rate standard, the last two recessions have been the
mildest in postwar history.
A final indicator of business cycles is the output gap, which measures
the percentage difference between potential and actual GDP. The analy-
sis of gaps is controversial because of the difficulties in defining and
measuring potential output. Some classical approaches hold that output is
essentially always equal to its potential, so that output gaps either are def-
initionally zero or quickly disappear. Among schools that believe in gaps,
some have measured the gap by interpolating between output peaks. Oth-
ers use Okun’s law and calculate the difference between actual output
and the output that would be consistent with a benchmark unemployment
rate such as the NAIRU; this in turn gives rise to other ambiguities about
William D. Nordhaus 201
Figure 1. Recessions and Declines in Real GDP Growth, 1948–2001a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA).
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culties in measuring the NAIRU. 
For present purposes I use a NAIRU-based measure of potential output
derived from estimates of potential GDP from the Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce (CBO).2 Figure 3 shows the output gap (again, only if positive)
over the postwar period. This measure is particularly instructive because
the gap measures the level of economic distress, whereas both ﬁgures 1
and 2 measure the rate of change of output or unemployment. Here again
the 2001 recession is barely visible. It pales in size relative to the major
downturns, in 1974–78 and 1980–85, associated with the two oil shocks.
Thus, by the third test, 2001 was again the mildest recession in the post-
war period.
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2. I revised downward the estimated growth of potential GDP in the 1996–2001 period
to 3.4 percent a year to reﬂect the most recent CBO estimates (CBO, 2002).
Figure 2. Recessions and Increases in the Unemployment Rate, 1948–2001a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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A second unusual feature of the 2001 recession was that the level of
output was relatively high as the economy emerged from recession. In
other words, at the trough of the recession, which I assume was the fourth
quarter of 2001, the gap between actual output and potential output was
relatively small.
Figure 4 shows the estimated GDP gap at the trough of each postwar
NBER recession, again assuming that the trough of the latest recession
came in the fourth quarter of 2001. The results are striking. The trough of
the 2001 recession was as close to potential output as in any postwar
recession; only the 1954 recession showed as small a gap. Indeed, to a
ﬁrst approximation, the economy was at its potential at the trough of the
2001 recession. This striking fact indicates, ﬁrst, that the recession was
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Figure 3. Recessions and Real Output Gaps, 1948–2001a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA, and CBO (2001, 2002).
a. Percentage difference between potential GDP and actual GDP when positive and zero otherwise. Potential real GDP estimates
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and, second, that it started from a peak at which output was extremely
high and unemployment very low for a peacetime period. This point can
be expressed in a different way, by noting that the unemployment rate in
the fourth quarter of 2001 was 5.6 percent, close to most estimates of the
current NAIRU, which cluster around 5
1⁄2 percent. 
By contrast, the Federal Reserve Board’s index of industrial capacity
utilization does not corroborate this high level of factor utilization, but
rather was close to the average for a recession trough at the end of 2001.
However, industrial production makes up only a small slice of the econ-
omy—approximately 20 percent of GDP—and this slice consists largely
of tradable goods for which domestic capacity utilization is increasingly
irrelevant (oil production being the most obvious example). The most
important limit on capacity is likely to be labor rather than manufacturing
capital. Thus the low rate of capacity utilization is little comfort for those
who worry about the inﬂationary risks that would be encountered if there
were a brisk, defense spending–led recovery over the next few years.
204 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
Figure 4. Output Gap at Trough of Recession for Ten Postwar Recessionsa
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA, and CBO (2001, 2002).
a. Calculated as the percentage difference between potential real GDP and actual real GDP. The potential GDP series is
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By NBER business-cycle standards, the 2001 downturn, however mild,
falls in the same category as the much deeper contractions of 1933 or
1982. This observation might well lead one to conclude that the tradi-
tional NBER business-cycle methodology, which identiﬁes only peaks
and troughs without reference to the depth or severity of the downturn, is
outdated. This approach was reasonable given the meager and incomplete
data available when Wesley Clair Mitchell and Arthur Burns invented the
business cycle dating approach several decades ago.3 However, in light of
the plentiful, timely, and comprehensive data available today, surely we
can do better than simply ﬂying a green ﬂag or a red ﬂag depending upon
the slope of the underlying economic indicators. In this I am reminded of
Tjalling Koopmans’s critique of Burns and Mitchell more than a half-
century ago: “[E]ven for the purpose of systematic and large scale obser-
vation of such a many-sided phenomenon [as business cycles], theoretical
preconceptions about its nature cannot be dispensed with, and the authors
do so only to the detriment of the analysis.”4
An alternative approach would be to develop quantitative criteria that
would allow one to categorize business downturns in a manner analogous
to the Safﬁr-Simpson hurricane scale. This suggestion in part reﬂects the
ﬁnding that the volatility of output, along with the frequency and severity
of business cycles, is declining in the United States.5 It also is based on
the view that business cycles are more like hurricanes than like pregnan-
cies:6 far from being a simple two-state phenomenon, they are extremely
diverse in their shape, size, and duration. The proposal is in part moti-
vated by the view that business-cycle dynamics are often grounded in
local instabilities that can grow into full-scale disturbances if they are
unchecked or trigger yet further instabilities.
As a start, I would propose categorizing recessions according to a scale
of I (a pause in economic activity) to V (severe depression). Based on the
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3. See in particular Mitchell (1913), which marks the beginning of the business cycle
dating tradition. The most systematic study was that of Mitchell and Burns (1946).
4. Koopmans (1947, p. 163).
5. See Blanchard and Simon (2001).
6. The pregnancy, or two-state, view is associated with Hamilton (1990). A look at ﬁg-
ures 1 through 3, or a more systematic examination of the transition matrix between differ-
ent states of the economy, would quickly reject the view that all recessions are a single
state. 
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employment, and unemployment, I would tentatively classify the histori-
cal recessions in the United States as follows:
Category I (pause in economic activity) 1963, 1967, 2001?
Category II (mild downturn) 1961, 1970
Category III (typical recession) 1949, 1954, 1958, 1975, 1991
Category IV (deep and prolonged recession) 1980–82
Category V (depression) 1930s
This “new view” of business cycles as heterogeneous in duration and
severity would also allow us to view periods of recovery as highly differ-
entiated. In the present recovery, which probably started in late 2001,
there is little room for the economy to expand before it hits the inﬂation-
ary danger zone. As a result, monetary policymakers are likely to hit the
brakes sooner and harder than they did in earlier recoveries. And the stim-
ulus package passed in March 2002 will be the latest exhibit for the argu-
ment that ﬁscal policy measures are generally implemented too much, too
late, and with the wrong sign.
Deciphering the Proﬁts Numbers
Part of the exhilaration of the 1990s was due to the rapid growth in cor-
porate earnings. For the period 1992–2000, proﬁts as reported in the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) grew at an average rate of
8 percent a year. Over the same period, earnings per share as reported by
Standard & Poor’s grew at 15 percent a year. 
Before digging into the concepts and numbers, it must be recognized
that “proﬁts” is a most elusive concept. There are at least four important
deﬁnitions: proﬁts for accounting purposes, proﬁts for tax purposes, prof-
its as measured in the NIPA, and economic proﬁts. The ﬁrst three are
widely discussed, whereas the fourth is usually ignored. From the point of
view of the corporation (rather than its shareholders), a reasonable deﬁni-
tion of economic proﬁts would be distributions to shareholders plus the
change in real net worth from one period to the next. Such a deﬁnition dif-
fers from the other three measures of proﬁts in important ways. Unlike
economic proﬁts, NIPA proﬁts exclude real asset appreciation; account-
ing proﬁts embody many concepts inappropriate to an economic deﬁni-
tion, of which the treatment of depreciation and capital appreciation are
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7. Petrick (2001, pp. 16–20) provides a full discussion.
8. When  ﬁrms enter or leave the S&P 500, continuity of the share price index is
achieved by creating a total market “divisor” to link different periods together. If the price-
earnings ratios of entering and leaving ﬁrms are unequal, this will induce a change in the
price-earnings ratio of the aggregate. The procedure is discussed at www.spglobal.com/
5sec3.pdf. An examination of the divisor suggests that ﬁrm substitutions are substantial.
The divisor rises when new ﬁrms enter with higher value than the exiting ﬁrms, when com-
panies issue new shares, or when two S&P companies merge. The size of the divisor has
grown by about 4 percent a year in the last decade, but there is no empirical evidence on the
reasons for this growth.
two; and both tax and accounting proﬁts treat capital gains inappropri-
ately by excluding some accrued gains and including gains that are due
only to price level changes.
In practice, the only available comprehensive measures of proﬁts are
NIPA proﬁts and S&P proﬁts. Several versions of NIPA proﬁts are avail-
able: NIPA proﬁts after taxes exclude adjustments for inventory valuation
and capital consumption, whereas NIPA adjusted proﬁts after taxes
include these adjustments. There are two published versions of S&P prof-
its. The ﬁrst is operating earnings, which are more or less the earnings
from continuing operations and exclude the impact of cumulative
accounting changes, discontinued operations, extraordinary items, and
special items; the second is earnings “as reported,” which include these
items. The earnings used in price-earnings ratios are the reported variant.
Although S&P and NIPA proﬁts are often compared, they differ sub-
stantially in their deﬁnitions, methodologies, source data, and coverage.7 I
will highlight some of the major differences. First, the S&P data cover
only 500 large corporations, whereas the NIPA data cover the entire econ-
omy, even including very small subchapter S corporations. Second, NIPA
proﬁts are designed to measure the income from current production
earned by domestic corporations, whereas S&P earnings are measured on
a ﬁnancial accounting basis. Third, NIPA proﬁts exclude capital gains,
which can be substantial; in 1998, for example, corporations reported
$205 billion of capital gains as part of their proﬁts. Fourth, the S&P data
come from a changing panel of ﬁrms, which requires a complicated chain-
ing procedure that ensures comparability of market value over time but
does not ensure comparability of earnings.8
The ﬁfth difference is seen in the capital consumption adjustment and
the inventory valuation adjustment, which together measure the differ-
ence between economic cost and accounting cost. Although these series
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are generally quite smooth, the capital consumption adjustment jumped
from $13 billion to $186 billion in the fourth quarter of 2001; this
increase led to a huge difference between adjusted NIPA profits and S&P
earnings. A sixth difference is source data: the NIPA data are in principle
derived from tax returns whereas the S&P data are derived from ﬁnancial
accounts. On the other hand, early estimates of NIPA profits are based on
financial accounts data, and they are often revised, whereas Standard &
Poor’s apparently never revises its data or takes into account restatements
of earnings.
Figure 5 shows these four measures of after-tax corporate proﬁts over
1985–2001. The top two lines are NIPA proﬁts after taxes, adjusted (the
upper line) and unadjusted for capital consumption and inventory valua-
tion (the second line from the top). The bottom two lines are operating
(the second from the bottom) and reported after-tax earnings (the bottom
line) of the companies in the S&P 500. The data for the fourth quarter of
2001 show divergent trends in these proﬁts numbers. After-tax adjusted
NIPA proﬁts increased 6 percent on a year-over-year basis, whereas the
three other series declined by between 23 and 36 percent. The NIPA ﬁg-
ures were affected by a one-time tax change arising from the March 2002
stimulus package, which allowed ﬁrms to expense 30 percent of covered
investments. Because the source data for the NIPA are extremely sparse
for the most recent period, it seems likely that the latest NIPA proﬁts data
will be signiﬁcantly revised in the next few years. 
All of the different proﬁts series have taken a major dive in the last few
years. As a share of GDP, the two NIPA series peaked in 1997 at just over
7 percent; since then their share has declined by about one-third, or by
slightly more than 2 percentage points through the third quarter of 2001.
The S&P earnings share peaked three years later. The lag of S&P earnings
behind NIPA proﬁts was not a feature of earlier cycles and has no obvious
economic rationale.
What might have caused this most unusual pattern of earnings? The
obvious suspicion is that the rapid rate of “innovation” in accounting
techniques has distorted the timing of reported earnings over the last few
years. Every day, the newspapers recount a host of new techniques by
which companies have bolstered reported earnings. Some of the most
egregious examples of these “Not Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples,” or NGAAP, include swapping capital assets such as natural gas
futures contracts (Enron) or “dark” fiber optic networks (Global Cross-
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inflow as current revenue; increasing the salvage value of trucks over
time (Waste Management); recognizing the returns to pension plans as
operating income (IBM); recording sales of products still in research
(McKesson HBOC); changing the pattern of accounting revenue from
rentals (Xerox); increasing the value of the unused capacity of landfills
even as they fill up (Waste Management); reporting happy pro forma
numbers when the reality is unpleasant (Amazon.com, Yahoo, and Qual-
comm among a crowd of other dot-coms dead and alive); using funds set
aside as merger and acquisition reserves to increase operating income
(Cendant); and doubling earnings by simply neglecting to include
expenses (BroadVision).9
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9. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s report on its analysis of Waste Manage-
ment’s NGAAP was highlighted in the New York Times (Kurt Eichenwald, “Waste Man-
agement Executives Are Named in S.E.C. Accusation,” March 27, 2002, p. C1). Swaps of
“dark” ﬁber optic capacity were also described in the New York Times (David Barboza and
Barnaby J. Feder, “Enron’s Swap with Qwest Is Questioned,” March 29, 2002, p. C1).
Figure 5. Alternative Concepts of After-Tax Corporate Proﬁts, 1985–2001
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA, and Standard & Poor’s.
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many, did NGAAP affect the aggregate numbers? Figure 5 suggests that
NGAAP earnings have indeed infected total reported S&P earnings. It
seems clear that the peak in S&P earnings lagged behind the peak in
NIPA earnings because companies were “managing” their earnings (in
this context, preventing an accounting decline in earnings). However,
they could only prevent the earnings decline for a couple of years, after
which they ran out of gimmicks, or the accountants—or else analysts and
the Securities and Exchange Commission—began to blow their faint
whistles. 
Another interesting feature of the recent proﬁts data, also shown in ﬁg-
ure 5, is that reported proﬁts are currently extremely low relative to oper-
ating proﬁts. The difference between reported and operating proﬁts is
primarily one-time charges that companies take to correct for past busi-
ness or accounting errors—as they hang out their dirty laundry, so to
speak. The declining ratio of reported to operating proﬁts late last year
probably reﬂects the tendency of companies to purge their earnings and
balance sheets of questionable elements in light of the Enron scandal. The
size of the write-downs became truly enormous in late 2001 and early
2002. Announced or estimated write-downs so far include $54 billion for
AOL Time Warner, $20 billion to $30 billion for Qwest, $15 billion to
$20 billion for WorldCom, $10 billion for VeriSign, $5 billion for AT&T,
$3 billion for Cisco, and the list goes on. Analysts are bruiting about a
total price tag of $1 trillion for the Great Balance Sheet Purge of 2002.10
In considering future earnings prospects, one must take into account
both the cyclical depression of proﬁts and the likelihood that reported
proﬁts are contaminated by an accounting purge. Figure 6 shows the his-
torical trend in the ratio of quarterly S&P (reported) earnings per share to
GDP and unadjusted NIPA earnings to GDP, where both are scaled so
that the average ratio over the 1949–2001 period equals 100. Again,
NBER recessions are shown as shaded areas. 
The two series in ﬁgure 6 move together during most of the period until
1990. Since 1990 the pattern looks quite different, with the NIPA num-
bers largely skirting the 1991 recession. The most dramatic difference
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10. “Buying Binge Could Cost Corporate America $1 Trillion,” USA Today, April 5,
2002, p. 1B.
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ings, presumably due primarily to the balance sheet purge. 
To obtain a more realistic estimate of earnings than the reported S&P
earnings, I have calculated a series of S&P earnings corrected for the
business cycle and accounting purges. This series, which I call “corrected
S&P earnings,” was calculated from a regression of the logarithm of S&P
reported earnings on the logarithm of unadjusted NIPA proﬁts after taxes,
time, a cyclical variable, and a constant. I then forecast corrected S&P
earnings by assuming that unadjusted NIPA proﬁts are set at their cycli-
cally adjusted level and that S&P proﬁts are at the level forecast on the
basis of cyclically corrected NIPA proﬁts. In effect, this uses NIPA prof-
its as a proxy for cleaned-up S&P reported earnings. I then forecast S&P
proﬁts for the period 2001:4 through 2002:4. The projection assumes that
real GDP grows one-half percentage point faster than potential output
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Figure 6. Trends in NIPA and S&P 500 After-Tax Proﬁts Relative to GDP,
1949–2001a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA, and Standard & Poor’s.
a. Shaded areas indicate NBER-dated recessions.
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S&P proﬁts, is described in more detail in appendix A. 
This experiment indicates that reported S&P earnings were indeed
depressed at the end of 2001 for a combination of cyclical and accounting
reasons. Reported S&P earnings for 2001 were about 30 percent below
the estimate of corrected, or “clean,” S&P earnings. If earnings were to
rebound to their forecast corrected levels at the end of 2002, they would
be 55 percent higher than their levels in 2001:4. 
In summary, there has been a substantial fall in proﬁts since their peak
in the late 1990s. The recent pattern of proﬁts suggests that ﬁnancial
ﬁnagling has infected the reported proﬁts ﬁgure, and in particular the
aggregate ﬁnancial accounting numbers, in the last decade. Perhaps the
best summary would be to recall the wisdom in John Kenneth Galbraith’s
saying that depressions catch what the auditors missed.
Party Time Continues in Equity Markets
Robert Shiller has argued, in his inﬂuential and exquisitely timed book,
Irrational Exuberance, that equity prices in the 1990s got seriously out of
line with economic fundamentals.11 In Shiller’s most recent analysis with
John Campbell, the bears of academe write:
We believe that our original testimony and article are even more relevant today
[March 2001]. Valuation ratios moved up in the year 2000 to levels that were
absolutely unprecedented, and are still nearly as high as of this writing at the
beginning of 2001. Even allowing for the possibility that the economy and
ﬁnancial markets have undergone some structural changes, these ratios imply a
stronger case for a poor stock market outlook than has ever been seen before.12
What has changed since then? The major developments since early
2001 have been the steep decline in earnings discussed in the last section
along with a sideways movement of stock prices. To illuminate the
Campbell-Shiller thesis, I have looked at the real return on equities and
the yield spread between equities and safe assets. The basic assumption
in this analysis is that the earnings-price ratio is a reasonable estimate of
212 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
11. Shiller (2001).
12. Campbell and Shiller (2000, p. 1).
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expected total return per share (dividends plus capital gains) corrected for
movements in the general price level. 
The derivation of this result is presented in appendix B, but the reason-
ing can be described verbally. Begin with the market value of the ﬁrm, the
assets of the ﬁrm, and the earnings or proﬁts on assets. For this purpose,
assets should include all tangible and intangible assets. Let q be the ratio
of the market value of the ﬁrm to its total assets, where marginal q applies
to new investments and average q applies to old assets. It will simplify the
discussion to assume that ﬁrms have no debt and to ignore taxes.
The conditions under which the prospective return on equity equals the
earnings-price ratio are neither obvious nor obviously correct. To begin
with, the theory needs to assume that earnings are an accurate measure of
true proﬁts, which deﬁnitely gets the exercise off to a bad start. One sim-
ple case where the earnings-price ratio is a good forward-looking estimate
of the return on equities is that where marginal q equals 1, the q ratios are
constant, and the expected rate of return on capital is constant. Some other
cases are discussed in appendix B. In reality, the q ratios and the expected
return on capital are likely to bounce around a great deal, and so the actual
returns on equity will differ from the earnings-price ratio. In terms of
market conditions in early 2002, the major reasons to believe that equity
returns will differ from the earnings-price ratio are, ﬁrst, if the rate of
proﬁt rises because it is currently depressed, and second, if average q falls
because assets are currently overvalued.
With these theoretical considerations behind us, ﬁgure 7 shows two
variants of the estimated real forward-looking return on equities over the
postwar period.Variant 1 is the earnings-price ratio for the S&P 500 using
quarterly earnings.14 Variant 2 takes variant 1 and performs the correction
for the business cycle and for accounting problems discussed in the last
section.
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13. Other popular approaches sometimes compare the earnings-price ratio or the
dividend-price ratio with nominal interest rates. These approaches make the fundamental
error of confusing real and nominal magnitudes—in effect assuming that the prices of
goods and dollar returns are constant.
14. The published measure of earnings in the S&P numbers (such as that used in calcu-
lating price-earnings ratios) uses a four-quarter trailing average of earnings. In the present
analysis I take seasonally adjusted current quarterly earnings at an annual rate and divide
this by the current-period stock price index.
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down during the postwar period and then declined continually after 1980.
In 1980 the forward-looking yield was around 14 percent, and the actual
annual return over the 1980–2001 period was 12 percent. The real yield
on equities in 2001 was between 2 and 3 percent a year, depending upon
which measure is used. The real forward-looking return on equities in
2001 was by a wide margin at the lowest level of the entire postwar
period.
Although the real yield picture is interesting, a more fundamental ques-
tion concerns the difference between the real yield on equities and the
risk-free (or a safe) real rate of interest. For this calculation I took the
risk-free real rate of interest to be the ten-year Treasury bond rate minus
the four-quarter trailing rate of inﬂation for the chained price index for
214 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
Figure 7. Alternative Measures of the Forward-Looking Real Return on Equity,
1950–2001a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA, and Standard & Poor’s.
a. Quarterly earnings-price ratio for the S&P 500, measured as reported earnings divided by the S&P 500 index.
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rate the “equity spread,” but others might call it the equity premium. Stan-
dard doctrine holds that the equity spread should be positively associated
with the systematic risk of equities and should deﬁnitely be positive.
Figure 8 shows two different calculations of the equity spread over the
last half century using the two series on the forward-looking return to
equities from ﬁgure 7. The story told here is slightly different from that in
ﬁgure 7. The equity spread declined sharply in the early 1980s with the
high real interest rates of that period. The spread then ranged between
2 and 4 percentage points in the late 1980s, and it has gradually declined
since then. At the end of 2001, the equity spread was close to zero—either
slightly negative if the uncorrected earnings ﬁgure is used or slightly pos-
itive if the corrected ﬁgure is used. 
According to the most recent data, and focusing on the corrected series
in ﬁgure 8, the spread has moved up slightly since the peak of the equities
market in the spring of 2000. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2000, the spread
between equities and bonds was a negative 157 basis points, whereas by
the end of 2001 the spread had moved to a positive 47 basis points. For
the latest period (mid-April 2002, not shown), bond yields have risen and
the corrected equity spread has dipped back down to minus 30 basis
points.16
William D. Nordhaus 215
15. Alternative approaches to measuring inﬂation would use the price index for corpo-
rate product or the consumer price index rather than the chained price index for GDP, and
alternative interest rates would be the real short-term interest rate or Treasury real interest
bonds. These would change the levels of the curves but would not change the general trend.
For example, over the last ﬁve decades, the real one-year Treasury rate has averaged about
70 basis points less than the ten-year rate, and so the spread would be that much higher over
the period. The average rate of inﬂation for the GDP price index was 0.3 percentage point
lower than that for the consumer price index for the last ﬁve decades. This suggests that the
estimated returns or spreads might differ by as much as 100 basis points a year if different
indexes were employed.
16. Changes in the spread could arise from many factors. Changes in risk aversion,
changing expectations of real growth in the returns on equities, and changing perceived
riskiness of stocks are the fundamental economic factors (as distinguished from technical
or psychological factors). Is seems hard to derive sound reasons why any of the three fun-
damental factors have changed so dramatically in favor of equities in recent years. It has
been argued that the equity premium was excessive during most of the twentieth century,
but no theory would predict a zero equity premium. Nor does it seem plausible that a model
with a constant equity premium ﬁts recent experience.
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and  ﬁnance professors actually believe about the stock market’s
prospects. According to Ivo Welch’s survey of 510 economics and
ﬁnance professors conducted in August 2001, the average equity spread
was estimated to be 3.4 percentage points for a one-year horizon and
4.7 percentage points on a thirty-year horizon.17 About 6 percent believed
that the equity premium would be negative at a one-year horizon, and
none believed that it would be negative at a thirty-year horizon. Clearly,
neither Campbell and Shiller’s writings, nor Shiller’s book, nor actual
earnings-price ratios have made much of a dent in the optimism of ﬁnance
professors.
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17. Welch (2001). The survey question was “I expect the average equity premium (i.e.,
expected return on the market net of the short-term interest rates) over the next 1 year to 
be. . . .” The market was taken to be the S&P 500.
Figure 8. Forward-Looking Spread between Equities and Bonds, 1952–2001a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA;  Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve; and Standard & Poor’s.
a. Forward-looking return on equities (from ﬁgure 7) minus the real interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds.
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The overall results suggest that the prospective yield on equities is
about equal to that on safe assets. At the same time, the prospective real
yield on equities is at its low point of the last half-century. The overvalu-
ation of equities has improved slightly since Campbell and Shiller’s last
gloomy prognostication, but it hardly looks rosy.
Summary
The basic features of the current recovery are clear. The downturn of
2001 was extremely mild, somewhere between a category I and a cate-
gory II recession on the economic hurricane scale. Because the economy
began the recession at an unusually high peak, and because the downturn
was short and mild, the economy at the trough of the recession (assumed
to have occurred in late 2001) was close to full employment in terms of
inﬂationary pressures. 
Corporate proﬁts are depressed relative to their peaks in the 1990s, and
the forward-looking real return on equities is about equal to the risk-free
real rate of interest, that is, the rate on medium-term U.S. government
bonds. For those who make their living in ﬁnancial markets, this is not
good news. Bonds are likely to get hit quickly if the economy recovers
sharply and the Federal Reserve follows its script of preempting inﬂation-
ary output growth. Stocks are still overvalued relative to most of the post-
war period—and this at a time of signiﬁcant prospects of ﬁnancial
tightening and growing concern about what bad news still hides inside the
black box of earnings statements. It seems unlikely that the United States
will soon return to the bubbly days of the late 1990s.
APPENDIX A
Derivation of Corrected S&P Earnings 
S&P REPORTED PROFITS ARE affected both by the business cycle and by
accounting fraud and low misdemeanors. To estimate a series of “clean,”
or corrected, S&P proﬁts, I use NIPA proﬁts as a proxy variable. In what
follows, Pt is measured S&P proﬁts, Pt* is true S&P proﬁts, and Pt*CC is
cyclically corrected true S&P proﬁts. NPt and NPt
CC are NIPA unadjusted
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cally corrected variable equals the uncorrected variable’s estimated value
at potential output.
The ﬁrst step in deriving corrected earnings is to obtain cyclically cor-
rected unadjusted NIPA proﬁts after taxes. This is done by estimating the
following equation from 1948:1 to 2001:4:
NPt/GDPt= a0 + a1t + a2(Ut – NAIRUt) + e1t.
I then measure cyclically adjusted proﬁts by removing the cyclical
inﬂuence:
NPt
CC= GDPt[NPt/GDPt– a2(Ut – NAIRUt) ].
Next I estimate S&P proﬁts as a function of NIPA proﬁts and a cyclical
variable:
ln(Pt) = b0 + b1ln(NPt) + b2t + b3(Ut – NAIRUt) + e2t.
Adjusted S&P proﬁts are then determined by using the forecast from
this equation with NIPA proﬁts at their cyclically corrected levels:
ln(Pt*CC) = b0 + b1ln(NPt
CC) + b2t. 
Recent values of reported and adjusted S&P earnings per share are
given in table A1.
APPENDIX B
Relationship of Earnings-Price Ratios to the Prospective
Real Return on Equities
THIS SECTION DERIVES the statements in the main text concerning the
relationship between the forward-looking real return on equities (re) and
the earnings-price ratio (e/p). 
218 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
0675-04 BPEA/Nordhaus  7/22/02  1:13 PM  Page 218Let qA be average q, qM marginal q, p the price per share, k total assets
per share, rk earnings per unit of asset per year, re the total return on equi-
ties per year, and d the dividend payout ratio. Assume that there are no
bonds and no taxes. We consider the real value of the variables in periods
t and t + 1.
To begin with, the earnings-price ratio in the ﬁrst period is equal to the
ratio of the return on assets to average q:
To derive the total return on equities, note that the price per share in the
ﬁrst period is pt = kt qA
t . Reinvested earnings are (1 – dt )rk
t kt, so that the
price per share in the second period is 
The total return on equities between the ﬁrst and the second period is
then 
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Table A1. As-Reported and Corrected S&P Earnings per Share, 1999–2002
Dollars
Quarter As reported Correcteda Ratio (percent)
1999:1 10.72 9.02 119
1999:2 12.23 9.06 135
1999:3 12.39 9.10 136
1999:4 12.86 9.65 133
2000:1 13.43 9.78 137
2000:2 13.18 9.97 132
2000:3 14.24 10.00 142
2000:4 9.13 9.73 94
2001:1 8.97 9.23 97
2001:2 4.72 9.20 51
2001:3 5.43 8.83 62
2001:4 5.70 8.40 68
2002:1 n.a. 8.50 n.a.
2002:2 n.a. 8.61 n.a.
2002:3 n.a. 8.71 n.a.
2002:4 n.a. 8.82 n.a.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA, and Standard & Poor’s.
a. Corrected for cyclical ﬂuctuations and accounting adjustments (as described in text). Values for 2002 are forecast.
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greater than 1. This case would apply when the ﬁrm has supernormal
proﬁts in one area (say, on a patent or a piece of software) but is unable to
leverage that market power into other markets. In this case, as long as
average q is constant, re = rk/qA = e/p. That is, the return on equities is
the rate of return on existing assets divided by average q, which is the
earnings-price ratio. This case is interesting because the return on equi-
ties diverges from the return on capital.
An alternative view would come about when marginal q is different
from 1. This case might apply for a ﬁrm that has been able to extend its
monopoly into other markets. In this case, re = e/p when d = 1, or where
all earnings are paid out as dividends. 
We can use numerical values to determine the forward-looking return
for other cases. For large corporations, assume that the rate of return on
assets is 8 percent a year after tax, average q is 1.6, and the dividend pay-
out ratio is 0.5. Suppose that marginal q is 1.3, which would imply that
ﬁrms could project some but not all of their market power into new
investments. Applying equation 3 then yields a forward-looking return of
5.8 percent a year, which exceeds the earnings-price ratio of 5 percent. 
As a ﬁnal case, assume that q deviates from unity because of specula-
tive bubbles or anti-bubbles, and that average q regresses back toward 1
with a decay rate of 10 percent a year; that is, on average q moves 10 per-
cent of the way from (q – 1) to 1 each year. Then, using the same numbers
as in the last paragraph, the forward-looking real return on equities would
be 2 percent a year rather than 5.8 percent a year and would be below the
earnings-price ratio.
The main point is that the forward-looking return on equities generally
involves both average and marginal q. And where average q is very high,
the forward-looking return can be well below the rate of return on capital r. 
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[( – )] / –






r drk kq d rkq kq





























220 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
0675-04 BPEA/Nordhaus  7/22/02  1:13 PM  Page 220Comment and 
Discussion
George L. Perry: William Nordhaus’s paper covers several related
aspects of the current economic scene: the recent recession and current
recovery, the behavior of proﬁts during and leading up to the recession,
and the prospects for the stock market in the recovery. He offers provoca-
tive ideas on all fronts. 
Nordhaus compares the ten postwar recessions identiﬁed and dated by
the NBER by examining four broad measures of economic loss: declines
in real GDP, declines in employment, increases in unemployment, and
positive output gaps as measured by the CBO. Output and employment
declines track NBER-dated recessions very closely. Increases in unem-
ployment lag these other measures of change, especially when measured
over four quarters as in Nordhaus’s ﬁgure 2, and this indicator yields sev-
eral false-positive identiﬁcations of NBER recessions. The pattern of out-
put gaps bears little relation to that of NBER recessions because these
gaps usually remain positive for extended periods after a recession
trough. However, if properly measured, the output gap would provide a
summary indicator of overall economic loss. 
From this broad-brush comparison of recessions, Nordhaus draws both
a particular and a general message. The particular message is that last
year’s recession was the mildest of the postwar period and that at its
trough, which he takes to be the fourth quarter of 2001, the economy was
virtually at its potential output. I will say more about that later. The gen-
eral message is that the NBER’s approach to recession dating is outdated:
recessions differ so much in their severity and length that a richer classiﬁ-
cation scheme is called for; meanwhile advances in economic science and
221
0675-04 BPEA/Nordhaus  7/22/02  1:13 PM  Page 221data availability allow us to do a better job of classifying recessions than
the pioneers of business cycle measurement were able to do. Nordhaus
suggests developing quantitative criteria that would allow business cycle
downturns to be classiﬁed more like hurricanes are, with several grada-
tions reﬂecting their severity. 
Nordhaus gives the impression that a lot is at stake in reﬁning our def-
inition of recessions and applying more data to the task of identifying and
classifying them. He hints that business-cycle dynamics could reﬂect the
propagation of small impulses into large outcomes, so that identifying
incipient virulent recessions would have important beneﬁts. As a scien-
tiﬁc matter, that is an important question and related to the more general
question of whether periods of recession are special, in the sense that
agents respond differently in recessions than at other times. That would
be a reason to care a lot whether we were in or heading for such a period.
If we could predict emerging weakness better, we should. But that goal is
and always has been hotly pursued. It has nothing to do with classifying
downturns according to severity after the fact. 
Turning to that more modest task, I agree with Nordhaus that the
NBER should look not only at changes in but also at levels of economic
activity in identifying recessions. And that criticism holds true even if we
do not expand the NBER dating committee’s limited mandate, which is to
identify  “a signiﬁcant  decline in activity spread across the economy”
(emphasis added). I have always believed that one strength of recession
dating by a committee of experts was that they were free to consider any
and all evidence of recession. There were surely stretches in the ﬁrst half
of the 1930s when employment rose, but we all speak of that whole period
as the Great Depression. And if we took away several months of dead-cat
bounce in the economy that followed its precipitous decline in the ﬁrst
half of 1980, the whole of 1980–82 would be one recession, not two as
judged by the NBER. It felt like one recession at the time. I see no reason
other than precedent for the experts to look only at whether measures such
as sales and employment are falling in identifying when a recession starts
and, more important, when it ends. 
However, going from principles to practice, I ﬁnd the CBO output gap
that Nordhaus uses in analyzing the level of economic utilization to be
inadequate. The main problem is that empirical estimates of the NAIRU
are the anchor for estimating potential output and the output gap, and
those estimates are not reliable. The best thing Alan Greenspan has done
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1995 about what unemployment rate was too low. I would have thought
that experience, along with some really good papers on the subject, would
have persuaded Nordhaus to distrust the NAIRU estimates, too. An addi-
tional problem in judging the room for expansion today is the uncertainty
about how fast the productivity trend is rising. 
What other issues does Nordhaus raise or imply? The recent recession
was marked by unusually good productivity gains, and therefore employ-
ment was weak relative to output. How to weight the two in identifying
recessions is open to disagreement, but it is not a matter of applying more
science. My sense of what we are after would look at both employment
and unemployment. Nordhaus’s more nuanced approach might favor out-
put, since it does not end with a simple yes or no on recession.
Another issue that Nordhaus raises about NBER dating is its timeli-
ness, but I ﬁnd this overdone. The Federal Reserve does not wait for the
NBER when it decides whether to act. So the dating committee need not
overly concern itself about when we knew we were in trouble in real time,
but rather about when, as a matter of history, to identify the turning
points. After all, that is what NBER dating is mainly about, and it pro-
vides a useful way to organize ideas and present results. The deliberate
speed with which the committee makes its judgments is appropriate for
that purpose. Some people think that identifying a recession or a recovery
has political consequences, but I doubt it. President George Bush, Sr., was
in trouble in 1992 not because the NBER had not announced that the
recession was over, but because unemployment was still rising as he cam-
paigned, and he was seen as not caring much about it. 
Nordhaus’s particular message about last year’s recession is consistent
with how he views current economic prospects. Because the recovery
starts with unemployment very near his estimated NAIRU, he sees little
room for the economy to expand. He concedes that capacity utilization
rates tell a different story, but he reasons that labor rather than capital will
be the limiting factor and that any rapid expansion led by defense spend-
ing will soon run into rising interest rates from the Federal Reserve. As I
see it, however, employment has fallen a lot, at the trough the economy
was far from its potential, and ample spare capacity is just what rising
defense spending needs. The Federal Reserve might raise rates before
long. But since that is what it usually does, it might not surprise markets
or have much effect on long-term rates if it did. 
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feature of the present situation. The difference between S&P operating
proﬁts and NIPA proﬁts has ﬂuctuated wildly since 1997, and Nordhaus
provides a colorful discussion of what he calls “NGAAP accounting,”
which must surely account for much of this ﬂuctuation. But puzzles
remain. The rise in NIPA relative to S&P proﬁts in 1996–97 seems
unlikely to have come from the accounting tricks that are probably the
major factor in the relative rise of S&P proﬁts in the following two years.
S&P earnings can be distorted by the changing sample of ﬁrms, and I
would guess that the relative shortfall of S&P earnings in this period
reﬂects the introduction, at large market value weights, of Internet-related
ﬁrms with negative earnings. The relative decline in NIPA earnings in the
next couple of years may reﬂect the exercise of stock options, which are
counted as a compensation cost in the NIPA. As to the relative collapse of
S&P proﬁts after early 2000, that pattern ﬁts the story that accounting
tricks that raise proﬁts in one period lead to a reckoning down the road. 
I take two messages from all this. The ﬁrst is that NIPA proﬁts are by
far the more reliable time series, in part because it is more risky to fool the
Internal Revenue Service than to fool shareholders and analysts. The sec-
ond is that we cannot hope to estimate the discrepancy between the two.
So how do NIPA earnings look today? In past business cycles, the share
of profits in GDP has regularly peaked well before the economic down-
turn, a pattern that could be decomposed into wage, price, and productiv-
ity dynamics. So if there is a surprise this time, it is that the strong
productivity growth of the late 1990s did not interfere with this regular-
ity. But even if the present cycle is not atypical, the last two quarters of
2001 should be viewed with care. Third-quarter profits were depressed
sharply by a bulge in capital consumption allowances, which I assume
was associated with losses from the destruction of the World Trade
Center. And fourth-quarter profits were boosted by retroactive acceler-
ated depreciation from last year’s tax bill. In addition, in the wake of the
Enron-Andersen scandals, there may be an unusual amount of cleaning
up of corporate accounts taking place, which could continue to depress
profits temporarily. 
Nordhaus concludes with a decidedly gloomy assessment of the
prospects for equities. Although it is taking a cheap shot to question any-
one’s stock market forecast, since so much of stock price movement is
unpredictable, I will discuss Nordhaus’s forecast because he has laid out
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tent with his view that the expansion is starting with the economy already
near its potential, he anticipates a very modest rate of recovery for the
economy. I have already indicated that I do not trust those NAIRU-based
estimates of potential or the limits to expansion that they imply, so I ﬁnd
his economic expectations too conservative. 
Using an equation that allows for cyclical factors in recent proﬁt levels
and that attempts to adjust S&P proﬁts to recent NIPA proﬁt behavior,
Nordhaus then estimates the near-term growth of S&P proﬁts that would
accompany such a modest economic recovery. He then embeds these
proﬁt estimates in a model of the spread between the expected real return
on equities, measured by the S&P price-earnings ratio, and the real return
on Treasury bonds. He ﬁnds that this spread is near zero, which, he notes,
is little changed from when John Campbell and Robert Shiller offered
their most recent gloomy appraisal of equities in March 2001. 
Nordhaus’s equity spread model is very pretty, but I ﬁnd it hard to
drive. His ﬁgure 8 shows that the equity spread has varied from zero or a
little below to over 14 percentage points. Large swings between optimism
and pessimism may appear again. However, I ﬁnd it plausible that the
growing importance of retirement accounts and mutual funds has reduced
the risk that many investors perceive in owning stocks and reduced the
equity spread that we can expect to observe on average over a long period.
And I ﬁnd it probable that proﬁts will rebound strongly from recent lev-
els. That does not mean this decade’s stock market will resemble the last
decade’s. Once-in-a-lifetime events do not happen often. But it makes it
unlikely that we are now at the edge of a cliff. 
General discussion: Robert Hall agreed with Nordhaus that the decline
in output has been modest in the 2001 recession. He pointed out that the
recession was about average in severity when judged by events in the
labor market, as Nordhaus’s ﬁgure 2 conﬁrms. The NBER’s Business
Cycle Dating Committee has studied the divergent movements of output
and employment carefully in this episode—such growth of productivity
during a recession is unprecedented. Nonetheless, the committee has con-
cluded that the episode is properly considered a recession by the tradi-
tional criteria of the NBER. Hall commended Nordhaus’s categories for
the severity of recessions, but he did not believe it should have a role in
the NBER’s procedures. The framework of the NBER is to maintain a
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A recession is the period between a peak and a trough. Hall disagreed
with Nordhaus’s tentative assignment of the 2001 recession to the mildest
category. He would place the recession in category III in terms of the
movements of employment (which he personally believes is the most
important indicator) and possibly in category II in terms of measures
related to output.
With respect to Nordhaus’s discussion of the stock market, Hall dis-
agreed with Nordhaus’s proposition that the earnings-price ratio measures
the forward-looking return on equities. This view rests on the notion that
the stock market values plant and equipment and other investments at
their acquisition cost only. According to the standard view in ﬁnancial
economics and on Wall Street, embodied in the Gordon dividend formula,
the earnings-price ratio forecasts the difference between the required rate
of return and the growth of earnings over and above that coming from
retained earnings. To the extent that ﬁrms have sources of earnings
growth other than investments that are only worth their price, there is no
puzzle about an earnings-price ratio that is below safe returns. Firms
could have monopoly positions that grow in value, or they could earn
growing streams of income on past inventions. For example, eBay’s
earnings-price ratio of only 0.7 percent does not mean that eBay will only
return 0.7 percent to its shareholders. Rather, it embodies the belief that
eBay’s entrenched position in the online auction market will generate
healthy growth of earnings for many years to come.
Robert Gordon emphasized that an NBER recession is understood as a
period of broad decline in economic activity. This implies that declines in
output are more relevant as a recession indicator than declines in employ-
ment. Growth recessions, as that term is commonly used, are periods
when output grows slower than trend for a sustained period. Since
changes in unemployment are related to changes in output relative to its
trend, changes in unemployment are not useful in identifying NBER
recessions. The level of unemployment is even less relevant. Gordon
noted that unemployment had reached its low point well before the start
of the 2001 recession and that it had continued to rise long after the end of
the 1990–91 recession. He remarked that the recession in 2001 had been
exceptionally mild and came very close to being a growth recession rather
than an NBER recession. This, in turn, reﬂected the unusually strong pro-
ductivity growth during 2001. Gordon regarded these productivity gains
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in the present cycle. 
Martin Baily remarked that some aspects of economic performance
since 2000 resembled a typical recession but that others did not. For six
quarters after mid-2000, GDP growth slowed to well below its trend rate;
thus the period qualiﬁed as a clear growth recession. But GDP declined
only in the last of those quarters. (It was not the last quarter but the penul-
timate quarter, 2001:3, when the decline occurred.) In contrast, manufac-
turing production fell steadily over the same six quarters, and steeply for
a brief period starting in September 2001. This manufacturing decline,
together with the decline in total employment since the spring of 2001,
looked more like a typical NBER recession, as did the large inventory
cycle that occurred. Looking at the income side of the economy, Baily
observed that labor income was strong relative to proﬁts and that compen-
sation of individuals at the top of the income distribution was rising as a
share of total labor income. He offered two conjectures on the weakness
in proﬁts: one was that high-income workers were able to extract large
increases in compensation despite the overall softening in the economy,
and the other was that intense competition both at home and from abroad
kept ﬁrms from reaping proﬁts from the solid productivity advances. He
added that these same competitive forces might have contributed to the
unusually strong productivity in this period.
Alan Blinder pointed out that the NBER concept of a recession was not
a useful measure of distress for countries like Singapore with their rapidly
rising productivity trend. For such countries a growth recession is a more
relevant concept of a weak period, because employment declines. Simi-
larly, if U.S. productivity has speeded up considerably, the United States
may experience NBER recessions only rarely in the future. Blinder urged
the NBER to consider reviving the concept of growth recessions, which
the United States had unambiguously experienced starting in mid-2000,
because they may now be the relevant measure of economic distress.
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